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Abstract
This paper explores an emerging sub-field of both empirical bioethics and experi-
mental philosophy, which has been called “experimental philosophical bioethics” 
(bioxphi). As an empirical discipline, bioxphi adopts the methods of experimental 
moral psychology and cognitive science; it does so to make sense of the eliciting 
factors and underlying cognitive processes that shape people’s moral judgments, 
particularly about real-world matters of bioethical concern. Yet, as a normative dis-
cipline situated within the broader field of bioethics, it also aims to contribute to 
substantive ethical questions about what should be done in a given context. What 
are some of the ways in which this aim has been pursued? In this paper, we employ 
a case study approach to examine and critically evaluate four strategies from the 
recent literature by which scholars in bioxphi have leveraged empirical data in the 
service of normative arguments.
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Introduction
In 2019, the first international conference on experimental philosophical bioethics 
(bioxphi) was held at Yale University [1]. The aim of the conference was to bring 
together experimental philosophers working on bioethical issues and bioethicists 
interested in using experimental methods from cognitive science and experimental 
moral psychology to inform their normative inquiry. A short position statement was 
drafted, and later published, spelling out the distinctive features of this emerging 
sub-field of both empirical bioethics and experimental philosophy (x-phi) [2].
One important aim of the workshop and the ensuing position statement was to 
probe the relationship(s) between, on the one hand, empirical findings in the cogni-
tive sciences and, on the other hand, normative or other philosophical questions at 
the heart of bioethics. In this paper, we aim to build on that ambition by exploring 
in greater detail how bioxphi studies have already offered normative insight into key 
bioethical issues, including the criteria for death determination and the necessary 
conditions for giving valid consent. Through a series of case studies, we analyze 
four argumentative strategies adopted more or less explicitly in recent scholarship. 
These case studies help to illustrate the pragmatic spirit of bioxphi, by which it 
seeks to build bridges between the empirical and normative programs of bioethi-
cal inquiry. At the same time, the cases represent good-faith attempts to assuage the 
concerns of moral philosophers who caution against drawing normative conclusions 
directly from empirical facts, as we will discuss.
Let us start by saying what this paper is not. It is not an attempt to recatego-
rize existing methods or approaches within the parent disciplines of bioxphi, namely 
x-phi and empirical bioethics, nor does it seek to place those methods or approaches 
into a new typology. With respect to empirical bioethics research, for example, we 
recognize that a large number of methodologies have been employed which are not 
accounted for in the case studies below (see, e.g., [3]). Consequently, by exploring 
these four recent strategies for drawing normative conclusions from premises that 
include empirical content, we do not suggest that these are the only strategies biox-
phi practitioners should employ. Rather, we hope to elucidate such strategies as they 
are currently being pursued within bioxphi, while remaining open to the possibility 
that other strategies from empirical bioethics could be adapted to research that rests 
more heavily on experimental study designs. To this end, we will start by situating 
this new area of research within its historical and disciplinary contexts.
Situating bioxphi: principlism, empirical bioethics, and experimental philosophy
Broadly speaking, bioethics grew out of the need to make real-world moral decisions 
in response to gross human rights abuses, from Nazi war crimes to the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study [4, 5]. Rapid innovations in health care during the 1960s also raised 
pressing ethical questions, including questions about how to fairly allocate life-sav-
ing technologies [6]. By the 1970s, it was clear that the field lacked a unifying the-
ory for guiding such moral decisions, with different practitioners relying on different 
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meta-ethical frameworks along with their own individual moral judgments about 
particular cases. Responding to this situation, scholars Tom Beauchamp and James 
Childress led the development of a shared normative framework that sought to 
incorporate long-standing clinical duties to maximize benefits and minimize harms, 
while also addressing concerns about justice and autonomy [7]. This approach was 
thought to provide a common source of normative guidance that bioethicists from a 
range of theoretical backgrounds could appeal to in their deliberations.
The four principles approach to bioethical analysis remains widespread to this 
day [8]. But even taking such principles for granted, questions remains about how 
they should be applied to specific scenarios or balanced against one another in situ-
ations where they seem to conflict [9]. A common strategy has been to take a coher-
ence-seeking approach in which the practitioner tries to achieve a kind of reflec-
tive equilibrium. That is, she attempts to “harmonize all the elements contributing 
to moral judgment, including intuitions about cases, moral principles, moral theo-
ries, and background theories of moral agency and social organization” [10]. Within 
this method, moral theories and principles function to “organize, explain, criticize, 
and extend our intuitive responses to cases,” while at the same time, “those very 
responses can, in turn, help us to amend and sharpen our principles and theories 
when they prove inadequate to the complexities of emerging cases” [10].
To better appreciate this general strategy, it is necessary to ask who the implied 
“we” is in the reference to “our” intuitive responses to cases. For the sake of clar-
ity, the responses of interest here are judgments regarding particular bioethical sce-
narios—for example, judgments that a certain course of action is morally preferable 
to another or that a given behavior is permissible or impermissible. These sorts of 
judgments have, traditionally, been those of the bioethicist, philosopher, theologian, 
or legal professional (in what follows we will shorten this list to “bioethicist” for 
simplicity). In this way, the judgments of particular individuals have long provided a 
key source of data for “armchair” approaches to bioethics, including the coherence-
seeking kind described above. But what if the judgments of bioethicists differ from 
those of lay people [11, 12], or from those of other stakeholders with different levels 
of expertise who operate across the relevant domains (e.g., health care practitioners, 
policymakers, patients, their families)? One possibility is that a bioethicist’s specu-
lative reflection, especially on abstract or idealized cases, might fail adequately to 
capture the concrete normative and empirical issues at stake in clinical contexts.1 
This, in turn, might call into question the real-world relevance of such reflection 
for both practice and policy.2 If the goal is to develop a normative position regard-
ing everyday clinical practice, for example, might the judgments of doctors or their 
patients constitute more relevant data? And supposing that the relevant empirical 
data pertaining to various stakeholder judgments have been identified, (how) can 
normative inferences be drawn on the basis of such data?
1 For a robust account of the different ways in which bioethics can bring moral reason to bear on practi-
cal issues, see [8].
2 For example, see [8, 13] for potential problems with a well-known theoretical critique of the distinction 
between active and passive euthanasia [14].
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Empirical bioethicists have responded to these questions in a number of ways. 
According to a recent systematic review [3], the majority of methodologies 
employed in empirical bioethics can be classed as either dialogical or consultative. 
Dialogical approaches involve actual dialogues between researchers and stakehold-
ers aimed at reaching a shared understanding and a joint resolution to a particular 
bioethical problem. Consultative approaches involve collecting empirical data relat-
ing to stakeholder views, attitudes, and experiences, and then using these as a basis 
for drawing normative conclusions. For the majority of consultative approaches, the 
end goal is the achievement of coherence either between stakeholder data and moral 
theory (narrow reflective equilibrium) or between stakeholder data and broader con-
siderations, such as background theories, moral principles, expert intuitions, morally 
relevant facts, and considered judgments (wide reflective equilibrium).
According to Rachel Davies and colleagues, the key difference between dialogi-
cal and consultative methods is the role of participants: whereas participants in dia-
logical approaches work together with researchers to analyze stakeholder data and 
develop normative conclusions regarding discrete problems on the basis of consen-
sus, participants in consultative approaches do not take part in the analysis or the 
process of forming normative conclusions [3]. Furthermore, the aims of consultative 
approaches vary, “ranging from theory development to the generation of concrete 
answers to discrete problems” [3, p. 7]. In addition, when consultative approaches 
aim to reach normative conclusions regarding a specific problem, they tend to 
employ coherence-based methodologies like the ones described above [3].3
Now we can ask how practitioners of x-phi, the other parent discipline of bioxphi, 
glean (meta)philosophical insights—including but not limited to normative infer-
ences—from empirical data regarding human psychology. The answer to this ques-
tion depends on how these practitioners interpret the purpose or function of x-phi 
in general. At least two main purposes have been identified, corresponding to two 
separate research programs, each of which can be understood in relation to the tradi-
tion of conceptual analysis in analytic philosophy [20–25].
The first program aims to make a positive contribution to conceptual analysis, 
though not necessarily through the provision of necessary and sufficient conditions 
for concept application (positive x-phi). The second program engages negatively by 
providing evidence against the intuitive assumptions of more traditional approaches 
to conceptual analysis (negative x-phi). However, as Joshua Knobe argues, regard-
less of which program they may claim to be pursuing, what x-phi researchers typi-
cally do in their studies is investigate experimental effects on psychological struc-
tures thought to underpin judgments held by participants [22, p. 42]. Consequently, 
the cognitive science characterization of x-phi suggests that experimental philoso-
phers study causal effects on people’s judgments in order to map and explain such 
3 Many moral philosophers hold that one cannot directly infer an “ought” from an “is.” By contrast, 
within the domain of health-related public policy, empirical research has often been viewed as affording 
direct normative insight into what should be done or recommended. For instance, the United Kingdom’s 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) seems to have grounded a public policy posi-
tion denying sex selection for social (non-medical) reasons on the normative weight of public opinion 
alone [8, 15–19].
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judgments using theories about underlying cognitive processes [22, p. 50]. As we 
demonstrate in the five case studies below, it is this characterization of x-phi as cog-
nitive science that is especially important for understanding what some recent biox-
phi studies have been trying to achieve, specifically in terms of generating normative 
conclusions from premises that include empirical assertions.
Bioxphi: aims and experiments
Building on the insights and methodological approaches of its parent disciplines, 
bioxphi seeks to contribute to three main aims. It seeks to (1) facilitate studies of 
a wider range of stakeholder judgments, going beyond those of professional phi-
losophers, bioethicists, and the like, (2) investigate how these judgments play out in 
more ecologically valid contexts (e.g., by employing thought experiments or exam-
ples that closely resemble the features of clinical or other real-life situations), and 
(3) develop a richer understanding of the underlying cognitive processes and elicit-
ing factors that shape the judgments themselves, such as by modeling the “variation 
in judgments across cases as a function of carefully controlled variables” [26, p. 
xxiii]. It is the last of these aims, with its focus on experimental methods, that distin-
guishes bioxphi—methodologically—from empirical bioethics; and the second aim, 
with its focus on realistic bioethical scenarios, that distinguishes it from x-phi more 
broadly construed.
Within the four approaches to bioxphi discussed below (parsimony, debunking, 
triangulation, and pluralism), the running theme is that a deeper understanding of 
the criteria underlying judgments about bioethical cases can help to address impor-
tant normative questions in bioethics. Taken together, then, we suggest that the 
three aims just mentioned—broadening the pool of judgments, increasing ecologi-
cal validity, and unpacking causes and cognitive mechanisms—may help research-
ers discern whether, when, or under what conditions bioethical judgments should be 
accorded some degree of normative weight. Nonetheless, the experimental study of 
bioethical judgments alone does not exhaust the scope of this emerging field. Biox-
phi can also involve experiments probing people’s use of ethical concepts or means 
of drawing moral inferences (among other psychological phenomena) as these relate 
to bioethical decision-making and policy development (see, e.g., [22–24, 26]).
Something more concrete should be said about the kinds of experiments under 
discussion, given that these are part of what distinguishes bioxphi from empirical 
bioethics. Although virtually any experimental method drawn from cognitive sci-
ence or moral psychology could be adapted to a bioxphi context, the dominant 
method of x-phi for the past few decades, and hence of bioxphi more recently, has 
been a particular type of modified questionnaire involving the so-called contrastive 
vignette technique (CVT) [27–29]. In its simplest form, the CVT involves designing 
a pair of vignettes that carefully describe a particular situation but differ by a spe-
cific detail that is expected to impact on participant responses (e.g., how much they 
think an agent described in the vignette is morally responsible for bringing about 
some outcome). This detail constitutes the experimental manipulation. The study 
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then seeks to investigate the effects of the experimental manipulation on participant 
responses (see, e.g., [30]).
Explicit responses, such as moral judgments, typically are measured on a Likert-
type scale or continuous visual analog slider, and statistical comparisons are made 
between the distributions of responses provided by the two groups. Because partici-
pants are randomly assigned to one or the other group, mean differences between the 
resulting response distributions should be attributable to the experimental manipu-
lation itself. This is very similar to experiments in other areas of research, such as 
placebo-controlled studies in medicine or crop yield prediction trials in agriculture.
In experimentally testing the factors that influence participant judgments, bioxphi 
shares methodological features with x-phi. The latter discipline, in turn, has bor-
rowed methods from cognitive science and experimental psychology.4 However, it 
should be noted that although x-phi (and hence bioxphi) has tended to rely on exper-
imental survey methods, such as the CVT, proponents have suggested that it should 
employ the full range of experimental methods used in the psychosocial sciences in 
order to expand the range of questions addressed [26, p. xxii]. This could involve, 
for example, the use of transcranial magnetic or direct-current brain stimulation 
devices to influence neural processes thought to be involved in shaping normative 
judgments [35]; the careful administration of psychoactive substances, such as psilo-
cybin or MDMA, that appear capable of altering the moral sensibilities of the user 
[36]; or a combination of experimental and non-experimental approaches, such as 
interviews, qualitative studies, analyses of linguistic corpus data, and anthropologi-
cal work [30, 37]. Regardless of the specific empirical methods employed, a major 
difference between x-phi and bioxphi is that the latter explicitly aims to inform nor-
mative discussions within bioethics.
Normative inference: from premises with empirical content 
to normative conclusions
Recall that bioxphi seeks to study the moral judgments of a broad range of relevant 
stakeholders; that it seeks to do so in an ecologically valid manner that captures real-
istic pertinent features of bioethical situations; and that it uses experimental meth-
ods to identify the elicitors and psychological processes that yield these judgments. 
To what extent, and in what ways, should empirical findings regarding stakeholder 
judgments play a role in devising solutions to bioethical problems?
Let us start by dealing with a red herring. We take it as uncontroversial that the 
most ethically justified conclusion is not always, or simply, the most popular one 
based on common opinion. However, as we acknowledge in the next section, empiri-
cal approaches to bioethics can, when certain conditions are met, appeal to the pres-
ence of prevalent, robust, or highly consistent stakeholder judgments revealed by a 
4 Concerns have been raised about the replicability of results in experimental (social) psychology [31–
33]. Meanwhile, there is evidence that x-phi studies have a replication rate of over 70% [34], more than 
twice as high as typical estimates generated for social psychology.
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study as one (ultimately defeasible) reason that counts in favor of a particular nor-
mative claim.
At the same time, we recognize that simply deferring to putative ethical experts 
can also be problematic, especially when their judgments or associated normative 
conclusions defy those of other stakeholders. Such knee-jerk deferral to a circum-
scribed group of people can enshrine prejudices and lead to dogmatism and parochi-
alism [23, pp. 126–148]. As Julian Savulescu and colleagues observe, some laws and 
policies do in fact run counter to public preferences [38]: bans on voluntary assisted 
dying in the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, for instance, have been 
put in place despite large majority preferences for permitting assisted dying [17–19]. 
Other laws and policies, however, seem to be grounded in mere public sentiment, 
which is to say they reflect majority attitudes—including attitudes of repugnance 
toward newfangled technologies—without necessarily appealing to more principled 
normative considerations [8, 15–19].
Typically, neither a direct appeal to an argumentum ad populum nor a simple 
appeal to a single set of supposedly expert judgments will provide reliable guidance 
toward normative solutions, proposals, or arguments that meet the needs of patients, 
practitioners, and policymakers. To get out of this bind, Savulescu and colleagues 
have introduced a number of preliminary proposals. First, they suggest that it is nec-
essary to identify the intuitions of those who have been careful in their reasoning 
and have a “clear understanding of the issues” [38]. But who are these careful and 
reliable reasoners and how does one find them? They might be among those ethical 
experts previously mentioned: professional moral philosophers, bioethicists, legal 
professionals, and the like. However, members of these groups make up a tiny frac-
tion of the population, and between them they may have idiosyncratic perspectives, 
conflicting judgments, moral disagreements, and incompatible moral inferences.
Furthermore, debates surrounding a specific bioethical or philosophical issue may 
have reached a stalemate with good reasons for adopting several positions and/or no 
adequate way for the experts to agree upon which position should be implemented in 
policy and practice. Consequently, Savulescu et al. offer the view that ethical policy 
should rely not only on “refined expert intuitions,” along with guidance from formal 
ethical theories, but also on “widespread public responses” [38].
A potential problem with such proposals is that they do not spell out what to do 
when widespread public responses, such as common moral judgments, and those 
of putative experts diverge or, indeed, what to do when they seem to agree. More 
generally, how do ethical theories, expert judgments, and the judgments of ordinary 
people relate to one another, and how can this information be integrated to draw 
normative conclusions? We will employ a series of bioxphi case studies to articulate 
and explain the four integrative approaches mentioned above: parsimony, debunk-
ing, triangulation, and pluralism.
We do not conceive of these approaches as (necessarily) fitting into an overarch-
ing step-wise procedure. That is, we do not suggest that one should start with par-
simony, move to debunking, then to triangulation and end with pluralism. Rather, 
answering a bioethical question in the field of bioxphi might involve the application 
of just one of these suggested approaches, or more than one, either in parallel or in 
varying sequence. Indeed, as we noted earlier, bioxphi studies might conceivably use 
 B. D. Earp et al.
1 3
still other methods not covered here. Accordingly, our aim is modest: it is to shed 
light on a small selection of recent strategies in the burgeoning field of bioxphi for 
generating normative conclusions from premises that include empirical components.
The parsimony approach
The first strategy is based on a principle of parsimony. This view assumes that ordi-
nary people’s judgments about certain cases carry significant (albeit defeasible) nor-
mative weight, such that experts who wish to make claims about what ought to be 
done should begin by carefully studying those judgments. The strategy is parsimo-
nious, then, in that it relies on the simplest possible model for deriving normative 
content from the moral judgments of ordinary people: it holds that those judgments 
should be given at least some positive normative weight. In short:
Parsimony. If relevant stakeholders consistently make a judgment p which 
encodes moral claim M, then M has prima facie normative weight.
One of the aims of studies employing this strategy is to gather data relating to stake-
holder judgments, often with the assumption that no matter what these judgments 
are, they are normatively significant. Once the data have been gathered, a proponent 
of the parsimony strategy might then identity the most consistent (e.g., common or 
robust) moral judgments revealed by a study and give these prima facie normative 
weight when deciding on a solution to an associated bioethical problem. Note that 
the normative weight accorded to such judgments need not be especially strong. The 
parsimony strategy requires only that these judgments, to the extent that they are 
consistent or prevalent, be viewed as providing some normative weight in a moral-
philosophical argument. They will never be enough on their own to deliver an all-
things-considered normative conclusion.
In this way, bioxphi studies that employ the parsimony strategy are consistent 
with consultative approaches to empirical bioethics, insofar as the latter rely on the 
robust judgments of some group of stakeholders as a basis for arbitrating between 
competing normative claims. However, consultative approaches in empirical bioeth-
ics tend to be concerned with identifying the most prevalent judgments (or attitudes, 
preferences, etc.) of the group, primarily through observational or cross-sectional 
methods. By contrast, bioxphi studies that adopt a parsimony strategy typically look 
beyond the mere prevalence of a given judgment and instead emphasize the robust-
ness of an experimental finding (e.g., across methods, materials, or operationaliza-
tions of a causal stimulus) regarding a given effect on participant responses (see, 
e.g., [39]).
There are two interrelated concerns with employing this approach in the context 
of bioxphi studies. First, it is highly likely that traditional moral philosophers would 
hesitate to accept such a method on the basis that it seems to derive normative con-
clusions from empirical premises without necessarily appealing to more principled 
normative considerations. Therefore, although the parsimony approach has been 
employed in the field of bioxphi, as seen in case study 1, alongside broadly similar 
consultative approaches in the domain of health-related public policy [8, 15–19], 
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we must reiterate that it is not an effective means of delivering all-things-considered 
normative solutions to bioethical puzzles.
This caveat relates to a second potential concern, which is that the parsimony 
approach seems to reduce bioethics to a popularity contest. We think this concern 
is unwarranted. As noted earlier, the fact that a study reveals consistent normative 
judgments does not entail that the associated bioethical issues are thereby conclu-
sively settled. Rather, consistent judgments are just one factor counting in favor of a 
given moral claim, and the normative weight accorded need not be strong. Indeed, 
reasons for granting more normative weight to a particular set of judgments are, ulti-
mately, defeasible if it can be convincingly shown that these judgments are unreli-
able or outweighed by some other moral consideration. In short, this approach puts 
the burden of proof on those who would claim that one should not respond to the 
ethical issue in question by according some normative weight to the most consistent 
judgments of relevant stakeholders.
Case study 1. Parsimony
“Judgments of moral responsibility in tissue donation cases” [40]
Consider a child who needs a tissue donation in order to survive. Suppose that her biological parent 
could donate the needed tissue. Insofar as it seems intuitive that the parent has a moral responsibil-
ity to donate the tissue, what drives this judgment? Is it the biological relation between the donor 
and recipient [41] or the fact that the donor is uniquely suited to provide tissue that will work for the 
recipient [42]? John Beverley and James Beebe, in a study involving a series of contrastive vignettes, 
found that “unique ability rather than biological relatedness was the primary predictor of people’s 
judgments of moral responsibility” [40]. To distill the normative relevance of this finding, the authors 
adopt a metaphilosophical stance: folk judgments need not “rigidly constrain philosophical theorizing,” 
but counterintuitive normative views (e.g., that moral responsibility stems from biological relatedness) 
carry an explanatory burden [40]. As such, the parsimony model would maintain that the “unique abil-
ity” judgment be assigned prima facie normative import.
The debunking approach
In contrast to the parsimony approach, which assigns prima facie (though not neces-
sarily strong) normative weight to stakeholder judgments, one might wish to argue 
that certain judgments should not be accorded normative weight when considering 
a solution to a given bioethical problem. One might make such an argument by test-
ing whether the judgment is unreliable, in the sense that the psychological processes 
outputting the judgment are not disposed to produce a sufficiently large proportion 
of true judgments [23, p. 96]. In other words, a judgment is unreliable if it is the 
result of a psychological process that is not disposed to reliably either “arrive at the 
truth” [43, p. 227] or “track the truth” [44, p. 54] as measured by some agreed-upon 
standard. A judgment could be unreliable in this way if it is the output of a psy-
chological process that, for example, has been substantially influenced by prejudice, 
epistemological distortions, or morally irrelevant differences in how a case is pre-
sented (i.e., framing effects). In order to investigate whether a judgment should not 
be accorded normative weight in a bioethical argument, one might wish to pursue 
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a debunking strategy derived from the following general argumentation scheme 
employed in x-phi (adapted from [24, pp. 31–56]):
Debunking.
(P1) Judgment p is the output of a psychological process that possesses the empir-
ical property of being substantially influenced by factor F. (empirical premise)
(P2) If a judgment is the output of a psychological process that possesses the 
empirical property of being substantially influenced by factor F, then it is pro tanto 
unreliable. (bridging normative premise)
(C) Judgment p is pro tanto unreliable.
Such an approach can be employed to assess whether ordinary people revise their 
judgments under various treatment conditions. Take exposure to a particular philo-
sophical argument. If people update a given judgment about a specific bioethical 
case after having reflected on a philosophical argument, then at least two points 
might follow: (1) they had not previously considered the philosophical argument in 
question; and (2) once they did, they abandoned their original judgment. But even if 
a particular judgment is shown to be pro tanto unreliable, why is this a prima facie 
reason for others to disbelieve the judgment?
The literature on moral judgments and their susceptibility to framing effects 
delivers two interrelated answers. First, as James Andow observes, the substantive 
influence of morally irrelevant factors on judgments is important because “it is capa-
ble of radically altering the moral position that one ends up endorsing” [45, p. 908]. 
If a person’s judgment about some case is the output of a psychological process that 
has been substantively influenced by a morally irrelevant factor, then there is a prima 
facie reason to doubt that judgment. But more than this, there is a reason to believe 
that a process of reflection based on that judgment “will only lead one deeper into 
error” [43, p. 244]. At least, the pro tanto unreliability of a judgment is one factor 
that counts against accepting it as a premise in a normative argument.
Second, according to Edouard Machery, “when a judgment-forming process is 
unreliable, the judgments it produces are severely deficient from an epistemic point 
of view” [23, p. 99]. Accordingly, the unreliability of a judgment undermines its 
justificatory status; that is, the judgment is not justified without independent confir-
mation that grants the judgment holder the ability to infer that judgment [44]. Here, 
when we say that a judgment is justified, we mean that a person ought to make it as 
opposed to suspending it, because she has “adequate epistemic grounds for believing 
that it is true (at least in some minimal sense)” [44, p. 48].
Accordingly, if a bioxphi study finds that a judgment is unreliable to the extent 
that it is the output of a psychological process that is subject to the substantive influ-
ence of a morally irrelevant factor, then there are inadequate epistemic grounds for 
believing that it is true—unless an individual can independently confirm the unre-
liable judgment by making some appropriate inference or argument [44, p. 51]. 
It follows that its unreliability is a prima facie reason for a person to suspend her 
judgment in relation to the bioethical case in question. Consequently, through the 
debunking approach, the result of empirical investigation—namely, the pro tanto 
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unreliability of a judgment—can be used as a prima facie reason that counts against 
the normative weight of the judgment in an argument that might be developed on the 
basis of it.
But a word of caution is warranted. When bioxphi studies adopt a debunking 
strategy, it should not be assumed that those conducting the study believe that the 
target judgment should in fact be accorded normative weight in a given argument. 
Rather, prior to pursuing the debunking approach, researchers in bioxphi would 
already have identified a normative argument or conclusion (for example, in the 
published literature) that appeals to this target judgment. The purpose of the bioxphi 
study in this context would be to employ the debunking approach to demonstrate 
that the judgment in question is, or is not, pro tanto unreliable. Evidence that it is 
in fact unreliable could then be interpreted as debunking the pre-existing normative 
argument.
In addition, when stakeholders hold a judgment that has been shown to be pro 
tanto unreliable in a specific instance, alternative explanations should be explored 
for why the target population holds that judgment. After all, one can never be sure 
that a particular judgment can be debunked in general: debunking proceeds by look-
ing at isolated, specific ways in which the psychological processes outputting certain 
judgments can be deficient (see footnote 5). To see what we mean, consider a hypo-
thetical study, inspired by Edmond Awad et al. [46], in which participants tended to 
favor saving females over males in a life-threatening situation, all else being equal. 
According to most contemporary moral theories, a sex-based distinction by itself is 
not a valid basis for treating otherwise equal persons differently. In such a case, how-
ever, the revealed judgment favoring females over males could turn out to be a mere 
proxy for some other distinction that is, in fact, widely agreed to be normatively 
relevant. Suppose that males vastly outnumber females in the surveyed society, lead-
ing to significantly negative social consequences. If participants from that society 
make a judgment that females should be saved over males, then it might not be sex 
per se that is driving their survey responses, but rather a preference for rebalancing a 
skewed sex ratio and/or alleviating attendant social ills.
However, even when remaining considerate of possible alternative explanations, 
one must also acknowledge that judgments can be affected by a number of factors, 
and at least some will be irrelevant to the moral question. Whether a particular pro 
tanto unreliable judgment is deemed to be relevant will, as in this example, depend 
on background theoretical assumptions that independently confirm the judgment, 
grounding the inference of those who infer it [44]. In this case, the relevance of the 
judgment that females should be saved over males depends on the principled nor-
mative basis by which sex-based judgments are deemed justifiable under one set of 
conditions but not another.
Experimental philosophical bioethicists can play a valuable role in cases where 
there are plausible alternative explanations for what appears to be a normatively 
unjustified judgment. In particular, they can conduct experiments to test the alterna-
tive explanations, often by carefully manipulating relevant contributing factors. For 
instance, in the above study, researchers might observe whether a pro tanto unrelia-
ble judgment persists when participants are asked to consider a hypothetical society 
in which females outnumber males. Depending on the results, such an experiment 
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could provide evidence for or against the alternative explanation for the original sus-
pect judgment. In what follows, we show how the debunking approach might be pur-
sued in practice, using two separate case studies drawn from the burgeoning biox-
phi literature: (1) case study 2 highlights an apparently failed debunking attempt, 
providing evidence that ordinary people’s judgments, in a specific instance, are not 
largely biased by a particular factor that would have made the judgments unreliable; 
and (2) case study 3 highlights an apparently successful debunking attempt, pro-
viding evidence that ordinary people’s judgments, in a specific instance, are largely 
biased by a particular irrelevant factor and so should not be trusted in the relevant 
case.5
Case study 2. Debunking: failed
“How do people use ‘killing’, ‘letting die’, and related bioethical concepts?” [49]
Laypeople distinguish killing and letting die by evaluating the morality of the physician’s intervention 
[50]. For example, doctors who employ end-of-life interventions that honor the wishes of terminal 
patients are seen as allowing them to die, whereas doctors who employ interventions that disregard 
patients’ wishes are seen as killing them [49]. The judgments of ordinary people may afford little 
normative insight here, in part because they lack the requisite understanding of the medical and clinical 
issues in play. This objection makes a straightforward empirical prediction: if laypeople acquired the 
relevant medical knowledge, they would abandon their untrained judgments in favor of the canonical 
distinction between killing and letting die as commissive versus omissive life-ending acts, respectively. 
However, David Rodríguez-Arias and colleagues found no evidence of this: doctors, medical students, 
and laypeople revealed strikingly similar judgments about end-of-life cases [49]. The determining fac-
tor appears to be whether the patient wished to live or die, and not how the patient’s death was brought 
about (i.e., via action or omission). Thus, the ordinary judgment could not be debunked on grounds of 
ignorance of clinically relevant details.
Case study 3. Debunking: successful
“Gender bias in pediatric pain assessment” [51]
Do people have a gender bias in assessing children’s pain? To answer this question, Brian D. Earp and 
colleagues conducted an experiment in which they manipulated the perceived gender of a young child 
getting a finger-stick to draw blood (based on [52]). To keep the experiment as controlled as possible, 
participants viewed a single video stimulus of a child whose sex could not be visually determined 
(i.e., the same video in both conditions). In one condition, participants were told the child’s name was 
Samuel, and in the other, Samantha. Participants then watched the video and rated how much pain the 
child experienced. Earp et al. found that participants rated the child named Samuel as experiencing 
more pain than the child named Samantha. Thus, perceived gender alone appeared to bias observer 
interpretations of felt pain (for alternative explanations, see [53]). Such evidence plausibly undermines 
the trustworthiness of judgments that, say, boys and girls should receive different pain treatment given 
a comparable injury.
5 There is an asymmetry between these two cases. If there really is conclusive evidence that a popular 
judgment is grounded in some factor that undermines its normative force (successful debunking attempt), 
then the judgment should be set aside or discounted. But if one fails to debunk a given judgment, this 
does not automatically entail that it should be trusted. Rather, it might still be normatively suspect on 
other grounds that have not yet been tested. So one should try to test, and rule out, the most plausible 
debunking explanations, and if one reliably fails in this, it becomes reasonable to treat the judgment as 
carrying prima facie normative weight—a process akin to Popperian falsificationism, notwithstanding its 
various shortcomings (see [31, 47, 48]).
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The triangulation approach
Suppose that the judgments of philosophers, bioethicists, legal professionals, or 
those with other kinds of expertise differ from the judgments of lay people. Alter-
natively, suppose that there are conflicting judgments within the domain of expert 
stakeholders, such as between bioethicists, legal professionals, health care practi-
tioners, policymakers, and patients. What should be done about such divergences? 
In such cases, experimental philosophical bioethicists could helpfully pursue a 
coherence-seeking strategy of narrow reflective equilibrium discussed previously. 
Accordingly, the coherence they seek will be between competing expert judgments 
and/or between expert judgments and those of lay stakeholders. We refer to this 
approach as a type of triangulation.6
Triangulation. Divergence among the judgments of various groups of experts 
and/or between expert and lay judgments requires the following: adjusting, 
pruning, or supplementing the normative conclusions derived from either 
expert or lay judgments in order to accommodate the normative implications 
of the opposing views.
Experimental philosophical bioethicists can perform three important roles in pur-
suing a triangulation strategy. First, using empirical means, they can identify the 
judgments of various experts and lay stakeholders in response to a specific norma-
tive problem, ensuring that the judgments respond to relevant features of ecologi-
cally valid contexts. Second, using the aforementioned argumentation strategies of 
x-phi and the methods of cognitive science and experimental psychology, they can 
experimentally investigate the cognitive mechanisms underpinning these judgments, 
ensuring that various expert and lay judgments are not pro tanto unreliable (and/or 
setting aside or discounting those judgments that are shown to be pro tanto unreli-
able). Finally, they can execute trade-offs among the respective pro tanto reliable 
judgments, revising normative conclusions as coherence and mutual support seem 
to require.
According to the standards of reflective equilibrium, the normative conclusions 
arrived at through this process, together with revisions to competing judgments, will 
be justified if and only if there is reason to believe that they will maximize the coher-
ence of the overall set of relevant considerations. However, in order to avoid the 
standard objection that the equilibrium arrived at “may be no more than a reshuffling 
of moral prejudices” [55, p. 22], the triangulation approach might be better charac-
terized as a coherence-seeking methodology based on a “moderate foundationalism” 
[56, pp. 26–30]. The problem that Richard Brandt identifies is that the coherence 
constraint on its own may not succeed in correcting for all the errors or biases in the 
6 Scientists and certain philosophers of science employ the term “triangulation” to refer to the use of 
multiple and independent sources of evidence in order to generate causal inferences from data to phe-
nomena (as opposed to phenomena-to-theory deductive inferences) [54]. Analogously, triangulation in 
bioxphi is one of the means by which experimental philosophical bioethicists have generated normative 
inferences on the basis of multiple, independent, and pro tanto reliable pieces of empirical evidence.
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respective judgments [55]. As already observed in the section on debunking, it will 
not succeed if the antecedent judgments are so unreliable that further reflection on 
these judgments will only lead bioethicists deeper into error. As a result, proponents 
must also explain how it is antecedently or independently rational to regard some or 
all of these competing judgments as (pro tanto) reliable [43].
It is at this point that we can appreciate one of the opportunities afforded by 
bioxphi: by employing experimentally based argumentation strategies that, in 
principle, give reasons to believe that certain judgments are not the output of 
psychological processes that have been substantively influenced by (particu-
lar) irrelevant factors, bioxphi allows conclusions to be drawn regarding the pro 
tanto reliability of those judgments. Once certain judgments have survived vari-
ous attempts at being shown to be pro tanto unreliable,7 the resulting judgments 
can be employed as initially credible judgments in the given process of triangu-
lation. Such an approach is moderately or modestly foundationalist because the 
degree of justification provided by the expert or stakeholder judgments that are 
each accepted as pro tanto reliable may be relatively low. Proponents of reflective 
equilibrium maintain that sufficient justification requires mutual support among 
the set of judgments—and, in many cases, among judgments, background theo-
ries, principles, and morally relevant facts [57].
According to T.M. Scanlon, those adopting the model of reflective equilibrium 
should ask whether there is more reason to revise a normative conclusion in the 
light of conflicting judgments or to give up the judgments that conflict with it 
[58]. Ultimately, as Ralph Wedgwood suggests, what is being proposed is a thor-
oughgoing form of fallibilism [43, pp. 64–65]. On this approach, it can never be 
guaranteed that one will not be rationally required to revisit and reconsider, and 
perhaps revise, the normative conclusions derived from the process of triangu-
lation if and when further reliable empirical evidence is identified. In this way, 
reflective equilibrium, even of the narrow variety, is an ideal that is unlikely ever 
to be reached [43, p. 265].
In practical circumstances, when, in pursuit of “good bioethics” [8], one is 
required to generate arguments that meet the needs of patients, practitioners, and 
policymakers, one will often have to bite the bullet, so to speak, and commit to 
a specific normative claim on the strength of available empirical data and the 
degree of coherence one has been able to achieve. As Scanlon suggests, such a 
commitment must be based on the best reasons counting in favor of the specific 
claim [58].
Case study 4 provides an example of the problems that experimental philosophi-
cal bioethicists may encounter when trying to navigate between expert and lay 
judgments. In such cases, proceeding with a triangulation strategy may not be as 
straightforward as seeking a simple compromise or accommodation. Rather, it will 
often be necessary to ask, in the case of judgments about a normative concept, for 
example, what the concept is trying to do—that is, what its function is (as opposed 
7 See footnote 5 for a discussion of some of the problems with attempting to demonstrate the general 
reliability of moral judgments.
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to its meaning) [13, 59]. As Sally Haslanger puts it, “What is the point of having 
these concepts? What cognitive or practical task do they (or should they) enable us 
to accomplish? Are they effective tools to accomplish our (legitimate) purposes; if 
not, what concepts would serve these purposes better?” [60, p. 33].8
Once again, it is possible to envisage a vital role for bioxphi in answering such 
questions. As Jennifer Nado argues, “the experimental philosopher’s focus on under-
lying psychological mechanisms seems to be a promising route (though of course 
not the only possible route) for discovering the purposes our concepts serve, and the 
means by which these purposes are achieved” [37, p. 92]. On this view, judgments 
about some normative concept should be empirically investigated to determine 
whether the normative concept in question is already fulfilling its intended functions 
to a reasonably good degree.
Case study 4. Triangulation
“Commonsense consent” [63]
In a series of experiments, Roseanna Sommers found that lay participants tended to think that deceived 
individuals could grant meaningful consent [63]. By contrast, in various legally relevant domains, 
including medicine, agreement or assent under deception is not considered valid. In this way, common-
sense consent seems to diverge significantly from the notions of consent that prevail in the law and in 
the relevant philosophical literature. One reason this divergence matters is that lay people sit on juries 
that can be asked to establish whether consent was present—often without explicit guidance on how to 
understand consent. This empirical finding can motivate: (a) contextual education for jury members; 
(b) reform of the legal concept; or (c) some adjustment of both concepts in light of additional consid-
erations (triangulation).
Depending on how the function of a bioethical concept is understood in the relevant 
contexts, different conclusions will be reached about how to navigate divergences 
among different expert judgments or between expert and lay judgments. Faced with 
a divergence, one might be tempted to make improvements to a given concept—that 
is, to increase clarity, reduce vagueness, remedy confusion, or bring about (other) 
desirable outcomes. Take the concept of futility as discussed by John McMillan [8, 
pp. 154–155]. On the one hand, physicians deem medical treatment to be futile if it 
is very unlikely to improve the well-being of the patient. On the other hand, physi-
cians also employ the concept of futility when an intervention does not succeed as 
a treatment, regardless of their beliefs about the patient’s well-being. McMillan pro-
poses to resolve the confusion between these two concepts of medical futility on the 
basis of their respective functions and uses.
With regard to case study 4, it might be determined that standard ethical and 
legal accounts of consent already adequately serve the forms of inquiry in which the 
concept is employed. On that basis, given that patients, physicians, and the public 
will be required to use the concept in legal and/or medical situations, some form 
of contextual reeducation might be needed to clarify, or remedy confusions in, lay 
8 For other broadly functionalist, experimentally based approaches to navigating conceptual disagree-
ment, see [21, 23, 37, 61, 62].
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judgments regarding consent—that is, to bring the lay use of the concept into line 
with the expert view. For instance, one application of the triangulation strategy 
could be to make improvements or modifications to the legal system in which the 
concept is employed (e.g., providing jury members with explicit definitions of the 
legal concept of consent and its relationship with deception) so that the intended 
normative work performed by the concept is no longer threatened by the divergence 
between expert and lay judgments.
Suppose, however, that a particular canonical concept is already clear, sharp, 
and free of confusion. Its application may nonetheless engender moral obligations 
that conflict with those that lay people intuitively recognize and, indeed, with those 
recognized by various other experts. In these circumstances, we might recommend 
wholesale replacement of a specific expert concept with an ameliorative one—
namely, one that possesses a superior practical function for the forms of inquiry in 
which lay people and other relevant experts employ the concept. For example, in 
light of persistent philosophical debates (and disagreements) about the distinction 
between the concepts of active and passive euthanasia, new concepts, with contrast-
ing functions, were developed: physician-assisted suicide, palliative sedation, and 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment [13]. Compared with the concepts of active 
and passive euthanasia, these new concepts have allowed a broader range of experts 
as well as the public to navigate the ethico-legal terrain more successfully [13, pp. 
34–35].
Nonetheless, the real problem hinges on whether the bioethical terms that have 
been developed for use in legal and philosophical practice are suitable for fulfill-
ing the purposes that previous terms have served in health care and medical law 
contexts. However, we recognize that for conceptual reform to be based on an all-
things-considered judgment, merely appealing to a divergence between expert and 
lay judgments will be inadequate. Although the triangulation approach is a useful 
starting point for conceptual reform insofar as it attempts to navigate between expert 
and lay judgments, it will require supplementation by, for example, seeking coher-
ence between the diverging judgments and broader normative considerations, such 
as background theories, principles, morally relevant facts, and the like (wide reflec-
tive equilibrium).
The pluralism approach
This brings us to the fourth strategy. Suppose that the best reasons count in favor of 
preserving two or more diverging expert judgments or the competing judgments of 
experts and lay stakeholders. In other words, suppose there are equally good reasons 
for adopting two or more different expert judgments or for adopting both an expert 
judgment and a lay judgment as the basis for (competing) normative conclusions, 
with no better reasons for adjusting, pruning, or supplementing the different posi-
tions. In some cases, such a scenario might justify a pluralistic response.
Pluralism. In cases where expert and lay stakeholders hold conflicting, yet 
pro tanto reliable, judgments or where multiple and independent communities 
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each reveal persistent disagreement between two or more conflicting, yet pro 
tanto reliable, judgments, these judgments may all have comparable normative 
weight.
The pluralism approach is similar to, and consistent with, the shared decision-
making approach that has recently become an important part of clinical practice 
and health policy. To be successful, shared decision-making relies on two sources 
of expertise: (1) the health professional as an expert on the effectiveness, probable 
benefits, and potential harms of different treatment options; and (2) the patient as 
an expert on herself, her preferences, social and personal circumstances, attitudes 
toward illness and risk, tolerance for pain and discomfort, long-term outlooks, and 
broader values [64–66]. As Jonathan Lewis notes, shared decision-making is most 
appropriately applied under conditions of uncertainty, which arise when a treat-
ment decision is preference-sensitive—that is, when medical evidence and clinical 
expertise suggest that there is more than one medically reasonable option, and the 
choice of which option is best for a given patient depends on her values and prefer-
ences [66]. In short, so long as the patient can fulfill certain conditions of autonomy, 
then she should choose the particular intervention that best satisfies her attitudes and 
preferences [66–68]. Case study 5 demonstrates how a bioxphi pluralism strategy 
can generate sets of pro tanto reliable judgments with comparable normative weight.
Case study 5. Pluralism
“Minds, brains, and hearts: an empirical study on pluralism concerning death determination” [69]
Pluralism concerning death determination states that people should be allowed to choose—within 
reason—what criterion will be applied to determine their own deaths [70]. It assumes that death 
determinations take place under conditions of uncertainty in the presence of more than one medically 
reasonable option. Against this backdrop, Ivars Neiders and Vilius Dranseika presented study par-
ticipants with a possible description of the process of dying that was divided into a number of stages, 
beginning with the onset of health deterioration and concluding with the onset of corpse decay [69]. 
They were asked at which of these stages they would prefer their own death to be declared. Three of 
these stages were designed to mimic the main conceptions of death discussed in the bioethics literature: 
higher-brain death, whole-brain death, and cardiopulmonary death. Given that the data reveals widely 
differing preferences concerning death determination criteria, Neiders and Dranseika argue that the 
pluralist solution fits best with the way lay people think about death determination. If one agrees that 
people should be allowed to choose their own conception of death, then, given that most participants 
chose one of the three criteria discussed in the bioethical literature, the study provides some prelimi-
nary empirical evidence for which conceptions of death should be used in generating a choice set.
Conclusion
Bioxphi differs in important ways from its parent disciplines. In contrast to empiri-
cal bioethics, bioxphi typically favors experimental methods, derived from cognitive 
science or x-phi, which help to characterize the features that shape our judgments 
(i.e., their determinants), as well as the processes that support them (i.e., the cogni-
tive mechanisms). Moreover, whereas x-phi attempts to derive (meta)philosophical 
conclusions on the basis of empirical data, bioxphi is specifically concerned with 
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understanding the normative implications of such data as they pertain to matters of 
bioethical concern.
Having traced the contours of this emerging discipline, we illustrated four ways 
in which experimental philosophical bioethicists have employed experimental meth-
ods to confront various normative questions that have captured bioethicists’ atten-
tion. Furthermore, we attempted to formalize the specific argumentative strategies 
of these approaches, while highlighting certain limitations and possible concerns 
inherent in each. Thus, our paper is not intended as a definitive map of the path-
ways leading to normativity, nor as a comprehensive defense of any single approach 
against the range of philosophical objections. It is more of a sampling platter, an 
exploration, an invitation for further discussion.
Most of the time, as the five case studies make clear, it is not obvious whether 
a particular scientific portrait of judgments vindicates or undermines their norma-
tive worth. Many of the case studies we presented involve ambiguous circumstances. 
How, then, can normative guidance be drawn from empirical research? The four 
approaches detailed here each provides the same answer: by bringing in further reli-
able evidence. Once that evidence is established, bioxphi offers an opportunity to 
better navigate competing views of different experts, as well as competing views of 
experts and lay stakeholders. Adopting a minimally realist perspective on morality, 
we might hope that this back-and-forth between different views (guided by theoreti-
cal frameworks and arguments) and the empirical evidence pertaining to diverging 
judgments can bring us closer to discerning what we have most reason to believe is 
morally true in the bioethical domain.
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